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~
STATEMENT BY WILLIAM J. CASEY 
AT THE PUBLIC HEARING 
OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
ON THE EFFECTS OF ITS RULES AND REGULATIONS 
ON THE ABILITY OF SMALL BUSINESSES TO RAISE CAPITAL 
APRIL 12, 1978 
Mr. Chairman and members of the Corrunission, I 
am pleased to express my views on the impact of the 
Corrunission's requirements on the financing of small busi-
nesses. The Corrunission is to be corrunended on holding 
these hearings. Your announcement of these hearings 
shows that much thought has gone into preparing for them. 
I will not specifically address the 75 questions 
suggested for comment. Other witnesses and the staff have 
more current and specific experience than I on how detailed 
steps suggested by these questions can best be implemented 
without impairing investor protection. I have to express 
the view that these improvements in disclosure and reporting 
requirements, while helpful and affording needed relief, 
only nibble at the edges and do not adequately address the 
grave national problem of restoring the availability of equity 
capital to new and growing businesses. I believe that bolder 
and broader steps are necessary to revitalize this innovative 
and creative segment of our e conomy, and I'm here to urge 
the Corrunission to make no small plans. 
There's something wrong with a national policy which 
undul inhibits offering a business 
investors who think they can afford it, while it encourages 
the general public, at any newsstand or drug store, to risk 
$17 billion a year in government-sponsored lotteries in which 
there is a guaranteed loss of 20% or so of the savin s. 
- I am confident that this Commission and its staff has 
the ingenuity and the resourcefulness to restore,with needed 
investors protection, the flow of $1 billion a year which 
during 1968 and 1972 went into these enterprises with full 
registration yet, as experience showed, without adequate 
investor protection. 
The flow of risk capital has been restricted by a 
number of factors -- tax disincentives, a weak and declining 
stock market, the impact of inflation on savings and on 
business profits, the impact of ERISA on institutional invest-
ment policies, as well as some SEC rules. 
I believe it is urgent to jobs and o~rtunity and 
- ~ 
price stability and, yes, to the quality of life here in 
--~ 
America and to our competitiveness in the world t t we 
unclog and strengthen the channels between individual and 
institutional savings and new and growing businesses. 
To accomplish this I suggest we will have to differentiate 
investors t hrough rivate c a nnels . This is a distinc tion 
contemplate d by the securities laws when e nacted, but a ll but 
obliterated over the last decade and a half by trying to pro-
vide the same protection for all investors. I believe i t 
necessary to de velop a new and more workable approach based on 
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distinguishing more sharply between the large mass of investors 
who need special protection and those who are reasonably able 
to protect themselves. Let me suggest some principles for 
your consideration: 
1. The general public should be encouraged to invest 
in seasoned com anies which analysts can appraise from past 
performance and by research into the present situation and future 
prospects of the company and its industry, its market and its 
technology. 
2. New and unseasoned companies should look primarily 
to sophisticated private and institutional investors, including 
specialized venture capital pools, who can evaluate and bear 
the kind of risk these companies represent. 
3. The present system should be revised to make this 
private route less uncertain and cumbersome and less dis-
couraging to new companies needing financing and to investors 
prepared to accept the economic risks in unseasoned businesses. 
4. In the private financing of small companies, there 
should be le iance on re istration for i vestor rotection 
and more on re the investor w the backing of the anti-
fraud rules to assume res onsibilit for obtaining the inform-
ation he thinks he needs. 
5. As these privately financed enterprises mature, the 
Commission's continuous disclosure system should be relied on 
to provide both investor protection and liquidity to existing 
investments. 
The major sources of equity funds should be looked at 
separately to understand needed to make them more 
inclined to resume the financin of small businesses. 
I break these sources down into four groups: 
1. The savings of individuals put into the 
public securities markets; 
2. The savings of individuals dealing with new 
and small businesses on a private or local person-to-
person basis; 
3. Professional venture capital pools; 
4. Savings accumulated in pension funds, life 
insurance companies and other institutions. 
Financing sources in the second and third categories 
and, to a limited extent, those in the fourth, are best 
suited to narrow and bear the risk of investing in new and 
unseasoned companies. The dividing line between these different 
sources of financing is not always clear. Their ability to 
evaluate and bear ~isk is quite different . yet the tendency 
over the years to impose on each of them Procrustean restric-
tions, which are often unsuitable and unintended, is a big 
part of the problem we have today. 
Raising money in registered public offerings has 
become prohibitively expensive for small companies. The less 
expensive Regulation A filing has become increasingly un-
attractive. The half million dollar limitation means that 
very few, if any, underwriters can afford to be interested. 
This in turn means that most issues are self-underwritten. 
The issuers who are not frightened away by this responsi-
bility are usually unable to sell more than a fraction :of 
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the issue. Both lawyers and underwriters are unhappy with 
the absence of audited financials. There is a wide-spread 
perception on the part of underwriters and professionals 
and investors that Regulation A provides second-class pro-
tection. Therefore, I believe that the Co n, in 
developing the S-18 form istration for small companies 
with its combination rocessin in the 
regional offices and audited financials, has taken a step 
which can provide important temporary relief but needs to be 
followed up by more fundamental measures. 
History tends to repeat itself, and we are likely 
to see at some point a revival of public interest in new 
and smaller companies. The SEC's hot issues hearings in 
1972 clearly demonstrated that registration of these 
offerings is no panacea. Indeed, if we learned anything 
from the hot issue trauma of the late sixties, it was that 
the registration process for small issues may permit as 
many abuses as it prevents. When an unseasoned venture is 
......-.......-
registered, it becomes available and saleable to unsophisti-
cated investors. Those least able to afford it are also least 
able to resist the combination of speculative fever and hard 
sell that may be both encouraged and insulated by the 
existence of an effective registration statement. Even 
with the additional disclosure requirements that came out 
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of the hot issue study, registration alone is unlikely to 
protect small inves s from salesmen rangin far and wide 
with optimistic forecasts in bullish phone calls. This hard 
sell is less likely where an issuer is trying to bring its 
offering within the intended "safe harbor" of Rule 146. 
Although the registration ess is capable of providing 
the kind of information needed to evaluate new ventures 
and unseasoned businesses, it frequently does not and it often 
becomes a hunting license encouraging open season on investors 
who can neither assess nor afford the while i s off 
those who can. The kind of information that experienced 
investors demand and get in a private placement is quite 
different from that normally found in a prospectus. The 
experienced investor wants to know not so much about the past 
as about expectations for the future and the basis for them. 
For years, while the SEC was prohibiting projections in 
registration statements, many if not most registered securities 
were being sold on the basis of estimates and recommendations 
delivered on the telephone; the reliability of these estimates 
and the suitability of accompanying recommendations has tended 
to fluctuate widely. By contrast, the typical private 
offering memorandum is likely to pin the off eror to a 
definite set of expectations. Indications of planning and 
budgeting, which are likely to appear in a private disclosure 
document and to be disavowed in a registration statement 
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can enable sophisticated investors and venture capitalists 
to assess the quality of management. Rule 146 has been 
at least partially successful in providing an alternative 
to costly registration of small offerings. It can be made 
less technical and less cumbersome and more useful to 
sophisticated investors and, in response to the Commission's 
request, valuable suggestions have been submitted to achieve 
that. 
Many valuable job creating, foreign exchange earning 
ventures get under way in this country by a pooling of the 
efforts and savings of a small group of people and by friends 
and neighbors putting up money to back a budding entrepreneur. 
As the document issued by the Commission to define the issues 
to be considered here stated: "The legislative history 
reveals that the Congressional purpose underlying the intra-
state exemption was to permit local financing of companies 
primarily intrastate in character without registration." It 
was thought that by restricting the offering to persons who 
are within the same locality as the issuer the protections 
afforded by registration would not be needed since, by virtue 
of their proximity, they would be likely to be familiar with 
the i ssuers and protected by the governing state law. 
Yet, the Commission's rules .have used a shoe 
horn to squeeze intrastate offerings into a registration 
box, requiring registration no matter how loca l the source 
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of financing if as much as one investor or 20% of the 
issuer's product can be traced out of state. Certainly 
this restriction can and should be reviewed to bring it 
closer to the original Congressional intent. 
We 'have seen the same narrowing of the private 
offering exemption through judicial rulings under the 
influence of the legal skill and persuasiveness which the 
Commission's counsel have always displayed. But certainly, 
t he law does not intend that a handful of people banding 
together in a business venture would have to register 
under penalty of giving any one of them a legal right to 
welch on a deal they had made together. Yet, that is 
the practical result of the virtual disappearance of the 
private offering and intrastate exemptions. 
Rule 14j_ or any other ~orm of unregiste~~d offer.:_ 
ing will never be sufficient to bring in capital by offer-
-
ings to limited numbers of investors as long as _the 
restrictions _ _i 144 rem~in ~-~ringent as they are. 
- ~ --- --
Frequently, a private placement with a professional 
investor capitalist or institutional investor is the only 
source of funds which is appropriate or available. The 
professional ventu 1 industr has assets of a 
billion and a half and invests about $100 million 
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a year which is more than the public market has put into 
small companies in recent years. 
These professional venture capitalists have been 
increasingly staying away from start-ups and young busi-
nesses, using their funds instead to take positions in 
established companies. Only four percent of their invest-
round financings -- a sharp decline from previous years. 
More and more of them have established a policy of avoiding 
start-ups by requiring an earnings record for at least one 
year before committing their funds. Apparently, experience 
has taught these firms a clear lesson. They must be able 
to recycle their mone 
their capital; the time lag and the serious difficulties 
in getting their money out of new businesses has pushed 
their funds toward more mature companies. 
The limitations that the SEC has developed on 
-
the secondary sale of securities are probably more damaging 
-
to small business financing than the high cost of registra-
tion and the near disappearance of the private offering 
exemption., Rule 144 has been successful in clarity 
and certainty to the requirements for the resale of 
securities purchased without registration. Where Rule 14} 
is harmful is in its effort to Erotect the market from 
selling pressure through quantitative limitations on the 
shares which may be sold in any six-month period .:_ This 
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quantitative limitation has a whole series of consequences 
that impede venture investing, are counterproductive t~ 
investor protection and promote concentration. 
This restriction makes the shares of many small 
companies second-class property. The owner will frequently 
not be able to require or justify the cost of a regis-
tration. He will not even be able to use his shares as 
collateral. This taint will continue indefinitely until 
the shares are eventually "leaked" into secondary markets. 
The certainty that all this will severely discount the valt:e 
of the restricted shares does not increase their appeal to 
sophisticated investors. Even when their intrinsic 
potential is enough to overcome these deterrents, the 
limitations on moving out of a risk investment cause 
venture capitalists to go in for smaller percentages and 
in lesser amounts. The restricted pace at which they are 
able to liquidate their investment contributes substantially 
to the trend to stay away from young compa~ies and to con fine 
venture capital investment to companies that have matured 
or seem to be on the verge of maturing. When they do 
have a successful investment, the difficulty of recycling 
their investment through private sales gives an edge to 
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the large company that can take over the new company in 
one bite. This, in turn, reduces competition and promotes 
concentration. Today it is moving our technology offshore 
to German and Japanese companies • . · 
As long as there are restrictions on unusual 
compensation and other selling efforts, it is difficult to 
see why any quantitative limitation is required. The 
seller's interest in not driving down the price of the 
shares he wants to sell can be relied on for any protection 
the market needs. 
It's disappointing that in the announcement 
of these h~arings, it was indicated that the need to 
revise the Commission's Rule 144 is not to be considered 
a~ese public hearings. When Rule 144 wa~ adopted over 
five years ago, it was, as I recall, stated to be an experi-
ment to be continously evaluated and im roved u on as the 
----
need and opportunity to do so became apparent. The quanti-
tative limitations of Rule 144 were supported by no empirical 
data. The then existing restrictions were simply viewed as 
too severe and cut in half by applying the same quantita t ive 
limitation to a six-month period instead of an annual period. 
I ha·ve neve r heard that any significant investor protection 
was lost by that step. 
It's been close to a year and a half since the 
then Chairman of the Commissi on. announced an econo.mi c 
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study into the need for this quantitative limitation. I 
confess to some scepticism as to what an economic model 
will tell us that we do not know from simple observation 
that the market absorbs the presently established quantita-
tive restrictions of regularly traded companies in a matter 
of days and weeks. While the study goes on, venture 
capital stays away from private placements in new and 
growing companies, and the need of many of these companies 
for expansion financing pushes them into a conglomerate 
or, as Senator Nelson recently pointed out, with a dozen 
or so examples, into foreign ownership. This is the kind 
of area in which the Commission has traditionally acted 
on the basis of a judgment balancing perceived hardship 
against theoretical damage. If the judgment turns out 
to be wrong, it can be reversed. 
You know how a steadily increasing portion of 
the nation's savings is being accumulated in large 
institutions. Today, the amount of money which employee 
,.----- ----. 
funds and other trusts and insurers must invest is so 
large that their managers do not have the time to place 
a million or two in. an innovative business. This creates 
a need for professionally managed pools of venture capital 
which will bring to institutional funds and even private 
investors the special opportunities which high risk 
investment represent to some tastes and needs. No one 
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is likely to undertake to create and operate such a 
venture capital company if it is subject to the Investment 
Company Act. Some Small Business Investment Companies 
have gotten out of small business financing to become 
operating companies and others have ref rained from raising 
additional capital from new stockholders because the re-
quirements of the Investment Company Act, enacted for 
companies investing in the public securities markets, are 
so burdensome in financing new and growing private companies. 
When I came to the Commission a hearing examiner had recom-
mended exempting SBIC's from the Investment Company Act, 
and two Commissioners had voted for the exemption. It 
seems. to me that another look at this in the light of chang-
ing -needs and circumstances is called for. 
Whether protecting investors should be subordin-
ated to other social and economic objectives such as the 
current need of small business enterprises is a threshhold 
question in your present inquiry. I agree with the Advisory 
Commisison on Corporate Disclosure that the protection of 
investors, through the disclosure to them of all material 
information necessary to an informed investment or corporate 
suffrage decision, should not be subordinated to other 
social and economic objectives, such as the encouragement 
of small business enterprises. 
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- -- - - - - - ----------------------------------
But there are degrees of protection. The very 
capable staff of the Commission cannot assure every bit 
of material information or all the protection that might 
_be desirable. Registration is not the only way of providing 
information. Participants in private and local transactions 
can and must carry responsibility to demand material infer-
mation. In Rule lO(b)S, the Commission has developed an 
instrument that1 over the last ·year or so, has produced expanded 
disclosure in offerings of municipal securities, which are 
exempt from registration. Also, the Commission has devel-
oped its continuous disclosure system to a point where the 
investing public has or should have readily available both 
historical and current information on the performance of any ~ 
company with over five-hundred shareholders and _9-_ssets 
one million dollars,or which wants to sell unregistered 
-· - ·-- ---------=-........ -~- ~-...._ __ 
securities under RuLEL-.1 44. 
The securities laws have been a wonderfully flex-
ible instrument, and it is to the gre~t credit of those 
who have served on the Commission and its staff over the 
years that they have had the ingenuity to develop and 
apply them to a constantly changing investment environment, 
to new practices and methods in trading and investing and 
to new forms of skulldugery. -But in this kind of adaptation 
of statutes and development of regulatory practice, it 
is inevitable that the process will occasionally overshoot 
its mark. 
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As an example, the statute never intended that 
an investor buying unregistered securities under an 
exemption would be treated as an underwriter or that the 
broker's exemption would be narrowed so that the Cornrnis-
sion could, as it did in Rule 144 1 perpetually restrict 
and permanently discount the value of unregistered shares 
acquired under an exemption. In fact, when the Commission 
I' .. 
was offering no action letters after the two or three 
year holding period, I don't believe this resulted in 
any serious loss of investor protection at all comparable 
to the damage to small business financing which Rule 144 
has inflicted. 
The SEC has, like most other agencies of govern-
ment, been slow to recognize and act on situations like 
this where the law has been developed or applied in a way 
which is counter-productive, or unnecessary, or distorts 
its original intention or all of these. 
Improving the registration and reporting process is 
a continuous task and it is encouraging to see the possibilities 
in that direction being so thoroughly explored. But, in 
addition, we need to revise exemptions which will encourage 
venture capital, which I believe substantial investors have 
in abundance, to flow to unseasoned companies. 
This is the way to direct unseasoned companies to 
the right kind of money. If the registration route is the 
only way to go, most unseasoned companies will be unable to 
afford it, and those who can will be pushed on too many hundred 
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dollar investors and that's the wrong kind of money. You 
have Rule 146 as an alternative too complicated 
and costly for the kind of friends and neighbors who finaztce~ 
most of the ne~~sinesses in thi.s country. 
_,.--. 
What is needed now is an act of will on the part of 
the Commission 
to recognize that public savings and attitudes 
have shifted direction in a way , which c ombined 
with some of the Commission's rules, have 
severely impaired our ability to generate and 
expand new business activity; 
to free entrepreneurs to get together with a 
limited number of backers without registration 
or potential liability, in the absence of fraud; 
to permit investors to resell interests acquired 
without registration after a few years as lo~g 
as information has been made available through 
the Commission's continuous disclosure system 
(the Wheat report found this compatible with 
investor protection a decade ago) ; and 
to develop mechanisms to facilitate the operation 
o f venture capita-1 pools without requiri ng them 
to have their capital commitments screened in 
Washington. 
I n some o f these areas the Commission can act on its 
own, such as exempting small business financing companies from 
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the Investment Company Act and freeing unregistered shares 
f:r:.::::om:::_~R~u~l~e::..,....:.,......_~fter three ears or five years. In other 
areas, it can, as it did with Rule 144, enhance investor 
protection by requiring improvements in its continuous dis-
closure system as a condition to the relaxation of rules 
which turn out to be unnecessarily restrictive. In other 
areas, legislation will be required. For example, the 
proper scope of the private offering exemption appears 
legislation to restore the original congressional intent. 
The Commission has only to take the limited offering concept 
out of the securities code that Louis Loss and his colleagues 
in the American Law Institute have drafted, convert it into 
a legislative recommendation with whatever modifications your 
deliberations suggest as appropriate, and the respect the 
Commission commands in the Congress would almost certainly 
result in restoring a workable private offering exemption. 
In conclusion, let me repeat the conviction that the 
Commission has before it an important opportunity to demon-
strate that government can retrace its steps and relax its 
grip, and that this Commission and its staff does have the 
ingenuity to provide necessary investor protection without 
maintaining restrictions and requirements which inhibit the 
creation and expansion of enterprises which can provide jobs, 
reduce our trade deficit, strengthen our currency and produce 
-goods to absorb inflationary pressures at home . 
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